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I. Presentation of the Paradox 
 
It is late 2015 and GOP nominees are carving up the conservative electorate in hopes of 
consolidating a base significant enough to win the ticket— the climate is not entirely unlike the late 
19th century Scramble for Africa. One thing is certain, in recent years garnering the coveted 
Evangelical vote (which, incidentally, generally encompasses not only Evangelicals, but also 
conservative Catholics) has been indispensable to the winning the Republican nomination. Though 
Trump now enjoys the unwavering support of religious conservatives, it is important to note the 
significant shift in support between April and September 2015,1 when religious conservatives 
dawned their MAGA caps and joined the Trump bandwagon, so to speak.  
The paradoxical support of a leader whose past and present has been marred by sexual 
misconduct and a seemingly unrepentant tendency toward misogyny, by an electorate which exalts 
the sacred call to fidelity and respect in marriage, can be understood through two hypotheses on 
gender and political representation. 
First, the Descriptive Identity hypothesis posits that the Macho archetype that characterizes 
Trump somehow resonates with conservative Evangelical and Catholic observants. It appears that 
the Trump candidacy has coincided with a masculine revival among conservative Christians in the 
U.S which started in the 1970s with antifeminist Phyllis Schafly and her famous STOP ERA 
campaign. This revival is characterized by a strict demarcation of gender roles, particularly focusing 
on masculinity, which encourages the acceptance and expression of men’s natural tendencies toward 
war, conquest, and domination and women’s innate propensity toward fragility, vulnerability, and 
sentimentality.  
The Substantive Pragmatism hypothesis posits that, in light of their painful loses concerning 
same-sex marriage and expanding abortion rights, conservative Christians endorsed the candidate 
most capable of defending their interests in the Executive, regardless of how much (or little) the 
candidate looked, talked, or thought like them. This hypothesis positions the recent flurry of 
Evangelical literature on gender not as a revival of some ‘traditional’ or static religious 
conceptualization of gender, but rather as a hitherto unarticulated assertion of ‘natural truths’ via 
religious arguments. This assertion can be considered as both reactive and nevertheless, rational 
counter-discourse on who men and women are, according to God and the Gospel, juxtaposed with 
what is perceived to be the current movement legislating moral deviance in American society: The 
Gender revolution.  
Let us first consider the case of the Descriptive Identity Hypothesis.  
 
II. Descriptive Identity Hypothesis 
 
 This hypothesis was inspired by the unsurprisingly strong coalition between Republicans 
and white evangelicals for the past thirty years, brought to a head by Trump’s 2016 candidacy 2016. 
                                                     
1 Pew Research study: Shift in support, Evangelicals and Trump between April and September.  
80% of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump, according to a Pew Research Center post-
electoral survey. In addition, during the same period, Republican Congress members remained 100% 
Christian and 70-75% Protestant, in fact the mid-term 2018 elections brought no changes to the 
religious landscape of congress, except for one Republican Jewish senator. But, nevertheless, how 
was it possible that the Evangelicals, who arguably measure highest in religiosity when compared to 
the rest of the American religious landscape, the electorate so committed to moral and family values, 
could have supported Donald Trump, as soon as the primaries began?  
 How could the endorsement of America’s most fervent electorate remain so unabashed in 
the face of Trump’s incessantly reasserted toxic masculinity and disregard for human respect— two 
character traits which would seem to be diametrically opposed to their own ethos? How could they 
have accepted as their political champion an irreligious man, who has been married several times, 
who is known for marital infidelity, sexual predation, objectifying women, racist rhetoric, and disdain 
for the poor? The same question can be asked of conservative Catholics who disapproved of Trump 
during the primaries (March 2016/April 2016), before changing their position in September, despite 
their leaders several calls to not to vote for Trump. 
 The hypothesis of scholar Kristin Du Metz (Calvin College) in her article “Donald Trump 
and militant masculinity" in the review Religion and Politics, January 17, 2017, caught our attention. 
She posited that many Evangelicals did not vote for Trump despites their beliefs, but because of 
them!  She asserted that Donald Trump’s macho attitude was behind his great success with the 
evangelical public as well as, to a lesser extent, with many conservative Catholics, following in the 
steps of Phyllis Schlafly, one of the most famous antifeminist and Catholic conservatives of the past 
who, describing Trump at the extreme end of her life just before she passed, as “an old-fashioned 
gentleman who prioritizes family.”  
 
Trump's Attitude: Make America Macho Again 
 During the Presidential campaign and consistently ever since, Donald Trump has 
demonstrated his virility through verbal and behavioral aggression, inciting violence (talking about 
pulling out his gun in New York), and making personal attacks against his enemies. His 
aggressiveness compliments his sexism:  He didn’t hesitate to mock women either in the media or 
politics that he deemed “without sex appeal.” He was caught, during the campaign, by incontestable 
records, legitimating sexual predation, in the style of a vulgar mafioso saying, “I’m automatically 
attracted to beautiful— I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t even wait. When 
you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything. Grab ’em by the pussy.”2 
 
Otherwise, Trump’s noisy and repetitive rhetoric on “making America Great Again,” as well as (we 
are made to understand) respected and intimidating, was also coupled with his ostentatious respect 
for "strong" countries and strong men alike, such as Putin or Erdogan, an admiration he has 
continued to publicly disseminate, since he became President, all the while showing little respect and 
confidence for democratic leaders of longstanding allied countries. He denigrates what he calls the 
weak/open European Union and weak/feminine Germany (referring to Chancellor Merkel’s 
leadership). 
 During his campaign, Donald Trump, then counseled by Steve Bannon (a man now 
working as a freelance lobbyist for European populists) labeled his political adversaries as defeatist 
liberals and unpatriotic Americans, while at the same time denouncing his international enemies 
(China and Muslims in general, and Mexican immigrants in particular).  
 How could such a narrative attract Evangelical voters? Kristin Du Metz asserts that there 
is indeed some echo of Trump’s Macho attitude within the "masculinist" culture demonstrated by 
far-right evangelicals, or groups presenting themselves as Evangelical, in current American media. 
 
The Roots and Growth of Christian Masculinism 
 We do not know to what extent this culture is truly evangelical, because we are not 
sociologists specialized in American Evangelicalism, but rather historians of ideas. We can, however, 
find some traces of a Christian masculinist movement in religious milieus in the beginning of the 
1970s and can trace its growth since then. This movement is rooted in a religious and cultural 
reaction against radical feminism and anti-Vietnam pacifism from the sixties and the seventies. At 
first, an antifeminist or “feminine” reaction surfaced, primarily through the work of Catholic 
activists, in defense of motherhood, as motherhood was seen, not as an undue burden for women 
not desiring it, but as the spiritual purpose of the feminine sex (see Clara Booth Luce, Phyllis 
Schlafly). In addition to that movement, an Evangelical reconceptualization of sexual difference 
emerged, asserting gender roles intended by God for each sex. Its theoretical framework was 
                                                     
2
 Arrowood, Emily (October 7, 2016). "The Very Definition of Sexual Assault". U.S. News. Accessible online: 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-10-07/hot-mic-catches-donald-trump-bragging-about-sexual-assault 
furnished by Dr. James Dobson’s writings and vision of the protective/dominating male architype as 
the result of a so-called "Judeo-Christian concept of masculinity." 
 Elsewhere, the anti-communist culture from Catholics and evangelicals played an 
important role in the public support of many religious leaders of the continuation of the Vietnam 
war. Considering the war to be a clear demonstration of the communist threat against freedom and 
faith, during the Nixonian withdrawal from Vietnam and recognition of Communist China, many 
Catholics and evangelicals considered the withdrawal a cowardly abandonment and an affront to the 
righteous American army and its noble determination to contain and destroy communism. A new 
discourse thus emerged, advocating for strong and courageous men, not the long-haired youth with 
no respect for authority, but real men to defend the country and the entire world from the evils of 
communism. With that discourse, according to Ann Loveland,3 the evangelicals consummated their 
special relationship with (and engagement in) the U.S. army.  
 The STOP-ERA Movement (1972-1975) exemplifies the conjunction of both antifeminist 
and new male valorization discourse, developed by the first interdenominational Christian coalition 
ever attempted. It would soon be called the Religious Right. According to Donald Mathews and Jane 
DeHart,4 a new interdenominational Christian movement, animated by a Catholic anti-feminist 
activist, Phyllis Schlafly and some future founders of the Moral Majority including Howard Philips  
then activist in the short-lived movement called the Christian Voice.  STOP ERA would succeed in 
stopping the Equal Rights Amendment, whilst this amendment was considered as absolutely 
consensual before their campaign of counter-communication 
 Rejecting the previous amendment as civilizational regression, the STOP-ERA Movement 
depicted it as destroying a woman’s femininity, forcing them to be like men, to be competitive, 
career-oriented, sexually promiscuous, inattentive to their children and family, eligible for wartime 
service and for all of the physically arduous work typically reserved for men. Masculinizing women, 
as ERA intended, would have been a matter of national security. ERA would have usurped from 
men their role of protection and provision and would have jeopardized American defense. 
 
Promise Keepers and Evangelical Masculinist Literature 
 In the 1990s, the issue of gay-rights and new publicly-supported theories on the social 
construction of gender roles, awakened a religious counter-mobilization, reaffirming and reasserting 
                                                     
3
 American Evangelicals and the US Military. 1942-1993. Louisiana State university Press. 1996 
4 Sex, Gender and the Politics of ERA. OUP. 1992. 
gender roles in concert with a wider attempt to reestablish a Christian society, ripped from its roots 
and foundations by secularists, homosexual activists, feminists, and liberals. 
 Part of this mobilization, the Promise Keepers movement, an evangelical campaign led by 
James Dobson (and others) organized a rally in Washington D.C. of about 800,000 men in 1997.  
Dobson said, "Promise Keepers is a men's ministry committed to igniting and uniting men to 
become warriors who will change their world through living out the Seven Promises.”  
 Several bestsellers, written by well-known evangelicals, developed the ideological 
framework of the Promise Keepers movement. Bringing up Boys by Dobson in 2001, with over one 
million copies sold, accused a liberal education system of a "war on boys," waged by the noisy band 
of feminists and others, who "attack[ed] the essence of masculinity" and wanted to make girls like 
boys and boys like girls, meaning "feminized, emasculated, and wimps." Future Men, written by 
Douglas Wilson in 2002, argued that boys need to be educated as warriors, because masculinity 
necessarily comports domination, "like Adam, men were created to exercise dominion over the 
Earth." Wilson invented a kind of fist-fighting theology, including an indispensable training in how 
to use weapons. Wild at Heart, by John Eldredge (2001) affirmed that the difference between men 
and women lies in the soul. The soul of a man is "profoundly militaristic" because “God created 
men to long for a battle to fight, and an adventure to live, a beauty to rescue." Eldredge concludes, 
"If we believe that man is created in the image of God, we must remember the Lord is a warrior." 
Aggressiveness is then part of masculine design. King Me: What Each Son Wants from his Father was 
written in 2005 by Steve Farrar, asserted that the Twin Towers rescue workers who gave their lives 
in the rescue mission would not have been so heroic had they not been raised as “true men” with 
“true virility” (and Christian) values:  
“When those two planes hit the Twin Towers on September 11, what we suddenly needed 
were masculine men (…) Feminized men don’t walk into burning buildings. But masculine 
men do. That’s why God creates masculine men to be masculine… the trend today is to 
major and minor on the warrior, but in the trenches, you don’t want tenderness…” 
 
A Consequence of September 11: The Birth of the Christian Warrior Culture 
 After September 11th, the call for virile heroes among Evangelical mediatized leaders 
increased. They asserted that America needed strong, heroic men to defend the country both 
domestically and internationally. In this discourse, the figure of the Christian soldier (a revival of the 
Crusader) fueled a military imaginary and was strongly influenced by the strong representation of 
evangelicals in the US Army.5 Biblical references like the conquest of Canaan, were used to 
legitimize the Afghanistan war and would be used again to during the Iraqi war (2002-2003). Unlike 
the international anti-Taliban coalition led by the US, which was created by the U.N. Security 
Council, the unilateral war against Iraq was nevertheless supported by 77% of evangelicals, 
combining national and religious revenge for a terrorist attack for which Iraq was not responsible, in 
order to eradicate the global threat that Iraq represented (Weapons of mass destruction), which it 
did not have. The Southern Baptist Church as well as Jerry Falwell declared “God is pro-war” in 
2004 and supported American intervention in Iraq, despite the critics and lack of support of many 
mainline Protestant churches in the US. Evangelical public opinion has also been more receptive to 
the harsh punishment of convicted terrorists. They support, more than others, the use of torture in 
order to dismantle terrorist networks. The Apostle Paul’s famous metaphor, in his Letter to the 
Ephesians, that Christians should take up the “shield of faith, helmet of salvation, and sword of the 
Spirit", was used literally on religious posters, to call the entire country to wartime mobilization as 
well as to represent American soldiers at war against evil. Many considered this to be exaggeration 
and condemned the posters because of their over-aggressiveness, citing statements accusing liberal 
Protestants, feminists, and homosexuals to be responsible, more than Islamist terrorists, for 
American decline and destruction. In 2005, Pat Robertson publicly said that he hoped for a nuclear 
bomb attack on the State Department, for its reluctance to heed to the excessive demands of the 
American military in Afghanistan. 
 Islamophobia was without doubt a deep feeling among American opinion during the 
2000s and it was echoed in the Republican party. But it was evangelical leaders who made the 
harshest proposals, reminiscent of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of civilization thesis, that Islam is a 
violent religion (Franklin Graham 2001), that Muhammad was a terrorist (Falwell 2002), and finally 
that “there is a worldwide war against Christianity… I definitively hate Islam” (Paul Rand 2016).  
To come back to the Evangelical endorsement of Trump, as Evangelical writer Dobson 
explained, “Well. Boys are boys.” The lack of outrage from famous Evangelical leaders concerning 
Trump’s heinous and sexist remarks could be understood as the same sense of masculinity. They 
might agree with Dobson, when he called Christians to "cut Trump some slack." Rev. Robert 
Jeffress, from the Southern Baptist Church of Dallas insisted, “I want the meanest, toughest, son-of-
                                                     
5 David Seay, Michael L. Weinstein, With God on Our Side. One Man's War Against an Evangelical Coup in America's Military, 
Thomas Dunn Books. 2006. 
you-know-what I can find in that role, and I think that's where many Evangelicals are.”  Strong man 
rhetoric appeared to be the most attractive for evangelical voters, mixed with the traditional image 
of the virile (white) man. Paradoxically, the more Trump’s vulgarity and toxic masculinity were 
denounced by the Left and the media, the more the supporters of militant masculinity were certain 
that Trump was the best fit for the job. In this way, it was logical for Trump to mock Hillary Clinton 
for her inability to do the job, to be the boss, because of her gender and to degrade her (and other 
Democratic female figures) as unattractive. To conclude, Kristin Du Metz insisted on the fact that 
evangelicals accepted the Trump’s caricature of manhood as their own, because he appeared at a 
time when evangelicals felt beleaguered, even persecuted. Issues related to gender, from the cultural 
sea of change concerning same-sex marriage and transgender bathroom laws, to the Hyde 
amendment and the contraceptive mandate, are at the center of their perceived victimization. The 
threat of terrorism looms large, American power isn’t what it used to be, and nearly two-thirds of 
white Evangelicals harbor fears that a once-powerful nation has become too soft and feminine. In 
Donald Trump, they believe to have found the leader they have been looking for. 
 
III. Substantive Pragmatism Hypothesis 
 
Erecting an Electorate: The Mobilization of Religious Conservatives 
The end of the Regan presidency in 1989 marked the end of a conservative golden age in 
American politics and was illustrated solemnly by the disbanding of the Moral Majority—the 
organizational motor responsible, in large part, for consolidating the Evangelical electorate. Yet, 
despite the organization’s institutional end and failure to reverse the Supreme Court decisions 
banning school prayer and authorizing abortion, its leader, Jerry Falwell, proclaimed victory saying, 
“our mission is accomplished,” and later “The religious right is solidly in place and… the religious 
conservatives in America are now in for the duration.”6 Conservative Christians, who had been 
notably absent from the political stage since their humiliating defeat during the Scopes Monkey Trial 
of 1926 (over the teaching of Evolution in public schools), had successfully reemerged as a 
formidable force in American politics and had outgrown their initial organizational network. Over 
the next twenty years they would continue to exercise political influence through increasingly 
                                                     
6 Peter Steinfels, “Moral Majority to Dissolve; Says Mission Accomplished,” New York Times, June 12, 1989. 
sophisticated, articulate, and well-funded media networks, society and culture ministries7, and 
political action committees. 
The culture wars continued and time proved that the mobilization of religious conservatives 
accomplished during the 1970s and 80s, not only among their own churches (which became the 
largest and some of the most sophisticated8 in the country), but also in the political arena (every 
Republican presidential candidate since Reagan has sought out the Evangelical endorsement) was 
there to stay. Despite a highly mobilized electorate, after the two-term Obama White House, it was 
unclear how effective Evangelicals had been in realizing their political objectives. The Bush-era 
limits on abortion were lifted, same-sex marriage was legalized in 2016, and Obama-care, including 
public financing of abortion and contraception, had become the law of the land. For a socially-
conservative electorate, primarily issue-based, Evangelicals had little to celebrate in 2016 and much 
to consider as they scrutinized the numerous nominees vying for their, still indispensable, 
endorsement. 
 
Infirming the Descriptive Identity Hypothesis 
A nuanced look at the reasons why conservatives voted Trump reveals three arguments 
which weaken the descriptive identity hypothesis. First, the highly polarized nature of the current 
American political climate, especially concerning presidential politics, makes it nearly impossible for 
non-swing groups to escape the two-party dichotomy. Unlike traditional swing groups, which are 
significantly less partisan, religious conservatives have always been characterized by a high level of 
partisanship because of their commitment to social issues like abortion, traditional marriage, and 
religious liberty. The question in a GOP primary is not whether or not white Evangelicals will vote 
democrat or republican—they are already a “safe” electorate, but rather, which republican candidate 
will white Evangelicals endorse? 
Polarization in American politics over the last few decades has not been without 
consequences, many of which impacted 2016 voter behavior. Quantitative research9,10 has shown 
that polarization is responsible for the increasing lack of civility in politics as well as the rising levels 
                                                     
7 The dissolution of the Moral Majority in 1989 marked the point where many conservative Evangelical ministries 
seeking to influence politics were no longer deemed to qualify as charitable organizations with 501(c)(3) status, as they 
had previously, and instead continued their advocacy as social welfare organizations with 501(c)(4) status.  
8
 In terms of organizational networks (Para-church organizations, publishing houses, and educational institutions).  
9
 Iyengar, Shanto, GauravSood, and Yphtach Lelkes. 2012. “Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on 
Polarization.” Public Opinion Quarterly 76:405–31. 
10
 Mason, Lilliana. 2015. “‘I Disrespectfully Agree’: The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue 
Polarization.”American Journal of Political Science 59:128–45. 
of animosity between members of the opposite party. The vilification of the opposing party has 
made members prisoners to their party because “no good American could vote for X.” Polarization 
has segregated the electorate and skewed perceptions of the ideology of the other party. A May 2016 
Pew Research study showed that while both democrats and republicans view their own party’s 
ideology as moderate, they view the opposing party as much more ideologically extreme.11 The 
prevalence of polarization in American politics today weakens the Descriptive Identity Hypothesis. 
Evangelicals endorsed Trump not because they thought that he incarnated their values and 
convictions, but because the civic/ideological bridge that they would have needed to cross in order 
to vote for anyone else had already been burned.  
Second, many voters—not just evangelicals and other religious conservatives, reported that 
their 2016 ballot was not so much “a vote for,” but rather “a vote against.” This explication has 
been applied to voters both on the left and the right who, far from believing their candidate to be 
the perfect politician, believed to be voting for the lesser of two evils. Numerous political 
commentators predicted that Clinton’s extensive political career (inevitably flecked by the scandal 
and unpopular political decisions that come with a lifelong career in politics) would alienate her from 
moderates and independents. Beyond Clinton not appealing to minorities and working-class whites 
in the same way that Obama did, conservative Christians perceived her as a pro-abortion, pro-
LGBTQ, far-left democrat, wanting to limit religious liberty. To put it simply, from the moment 
they were born-again (politically speaking) in the 1970s, religious conservatives have been decrying 
and combating the moral degradation of American society through the ballot box, and a vote for 
Clinton would have been a vote against the realization of that goal. The evangelical endorsement of 
Trump must not be understood in such a reductivist way as to imagine that it was only, as the term 
suggests, an endorsement, but also, and perhaps more significantly, a disapproval of the alternative.    
Finally, poll data12 measuring the evangelical endorsement of Trump early on13 in the 
Primary season reveal interesting nuances when analyzed according to the attendance variable, a 
fundamental indicator of religiosity. The study found that “Trump received much more support 
during the GOP primaries from Republicans who do not attend religious services every week” (28 
% steady supporters and 36% skeptic) when compared to those who attend weekly (15% steady 
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 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/23/partisans-see-opposing-party-as-more-ideological-than-their-
own/  
12
 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/21/churchgoing-republicans-once-skeptical-of-trump-now-support-
him/  
13
 Between December 2015 and April 2016.  
supporters and 57% skeptics). These data indicate that among the most religious, Trump was viewed 
less favorably than other GOP candidates. A second study14 showed that in the beginning of the 
primary season (March 2016), among evangelicals who attended church weekly or more, Ted Cruz 
lead by 16 percentage points over Trump. The 94% Evangelical endorsement of Trump only 
occurred after Trump had won the Republican nomination. These data infirm the descriptive 
identity hypothesis because if evangelicals believed Trump to truly embody their religious values and 
interests, then one would expect the most fervent believers to have supported his candidacy since 
the beginning of the primary. Supporting him only after he won the GOP nomination merely 
demonstrates that given no other options, they would rather support Trump than Clinton.  
 
The Solution of Substantive Pragmatism: 
After Trump’s win of the GOP primary, the world watched with bated breath as a bonafide 
miracle stupefied political onlookers: a supermajority of conservative Christians put their support 
behind Trump for the general election. It appeared, to most, that one of two phenomena had taken 
place. Either American evangelicals had “sold their soul to the Devil” and allied themselves to 
someone diametrically opposed to the religious and social values that they had spent the last nearly 
fifty years preaching to the rest of America; or evangelicals found in Donald Trump the macho, tell-
it-like-it-is maverick that the rest of America was either too damned or too dumb to elect 
themselves. Making generalizations about the motivations behind voter behavior in a single election 
and then applying them to roughly 62.2 million people15 involves some inherent risks, but evidence 
gives reason to believe that rather than a simple case of misogynistic hypocrisy, the real story behind 
the evangelical endorsement is a bit more complex. Let us consider the evidence for what might be 
termed, the substantive pragmatism hypothesis.  
Let us begin with the second part of the qualification. The evangelical endorsement of 
Trump was foremost a choice of pragmatism and strategy in the face of political necessity. In recent 
years, American evangelicals have experienced heavy losses in most of their fundamental policy 
battles and less-than-desired support from their Republican representatives. One of Trump’s earliest 
and most outspoken evangelical supporters, Jerry Falwell Jr., president of Liberty University and son 
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 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/04/trump-has-benefited-from-evangelicals-support-but-hes-not-
the-first-choice-of-the-most-committed/  
15 The Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study estimated the number of U.S. adults that identify with the 
term evangelical to be roughly 62.2 million, or about 25.4% of the total population. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/03/01/5-facts-about-u-s-evangelical-protestants/  
of the co-founder of the Moral Majority, Jerry Falwell Sr., criticized past evangelical-Republican 
alliances calling for a new more dependable partnership, “after Ronald Reagan – and even with 
Reagan a little bit – the Republicans betrayed evangelicals. When they were in office, they didn’t take 
actions that were consistent with their campaign rhetoric.”16 Trump promised sympathy and 
unconditional advocacy of their interests in the Executive, tailor re-making his policy views and 
deepest personal convictions to fit what evangelicals needed to see in their presidential candidate. 
Founder of Focus on the Family, and one of the most influential Evangelical leaders of the past 
thirty years, James Dobson, endorsed Donald Trump in June 2016 after Trump promised to appoint 
Pro-Life justices to the Supreme Court. In an interview with Christianity Today, Dobson explained his 
logic: 
“I’m not under any illusions that he is an outstanding moral example,” and that “In 
many ways, this is a single-issue election because it will affect every dimension of 
American life: the makeup of the Supreme Court... The next president will nominate 
perhaps three or more justices whose judicial philosophy will shape our country for 
generations to come.”17 
 
Since the mobilization of evangelicals and conservative Catholics in the 1980s, the guiding 
principle has been constant: “rescue America from moral decay.” If we accept Dobson’s logic, as at 
least one quarter of the American electorate did, ensuring Supreme Court justices would be 
sympathetic to Evangelical interests was worth a Trump endorsement. It was pragmatism or purity, 
and it seems like at least this time around, American evangelicals chose to vote for pragmatism. 
The above quote from Dobson also reveals a second truth, which defends the claim of 
substantive pragmatism in the hypothesis. Dobson acknowledges the moral disconnect between 
evangelical teachings and Trump’s apparent moral bankruptcy, but decides that such an unholy 
alliance is necessary for the survival of the country “for generations to come.” Other evangelical 
leaders suggest that the President can be pardoned as long as he continues to hold up his end of the 
political bargain. Tony Perkins, the president of the evangelical activist group, The Family Research 
Council, speaking of Trump’s sex scandal with porn actress Stormy Daniels, said, “We kind of gave 
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news/2018/oct/09/christian-leader-jerry-falwell-urges-trump-support-hes-a-moral-person  
17 “James Dobson: Why I Am Voting for Donald Trump.” Christianity Today. 
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him—‘All right, you get a mulligan. You get a do-over here.” And later concerning the president’s 
effectiveness in representing evangelical interests:  
“I don’t think this president is using evangelicals. … I think he genuinely enjoys the 
relationship that had developed. He has found, I think—and he’s a very transactional 
president. Trust is important to him. Loyalty is important to him, and I think in this 
transaction, he realizes, ‘Hey, these are people I can count on, because they don’t blow 
with the political winds,’” he says. “It’s a developing relationship, but I’ll have to say 
this: From a policy standpoint, he has delivered more than any other president in my 
lifetime... Whenever the policy stops, and his administration reverts to just 
personality…that’s where I believe the president will be in trouble.”18 
 
To this day, Trump continues to enjoy strong approval ratings from evangelicals and has 
received their highest praise for his appointment of two pro-religious liberty justices to the Supreme 
Court and his commitments on Israel, abortion, and religious liberty. Analysts all agree, the 2016 
election brought about many unexpected results, not in the least was the massive evangelical support 
for Trump. The 2016 election marks a clear change in the way evangelicals work with GOP 
politicians. In the past, candidates needed to look like evangelicals (Bush, Romney, Reagan) in order 
to represent them effectively. There is no telling what 2020 and 2024 will hold for evangelicals in 
politics, but for the time being, it seems as though a purely substantive model of representation is 
coherent with the expectations of America’s most religious electorate, as long as the candidate 
makes good on his or her promises. 
                                                     
18
 Tony Perkins interview with Politico in January 2018. Accessible online: 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/23/tony-perkins-evangelicals-donald-trump-stormy-daniels-
216498  
